The founding of the Third Republic coincided with the creation of a particular political and economic arrangement which Stanley Hoffmann has variously called the "Republican synthesis" and the "Republican equilibrium." This arrangement stabilized French society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, perhaps to the point of"stalemate," but in any case it enabled the Third Republic to survive longer than any other French regime since 1789. Because it ultimately rested on the support of the bourgeoisie and the peasantry, its formation depended on forging those elements of society into a "Republican consensus" (again Hoffmann's term) by the accommodation of their interests-that is to say, by the formulation of policies which preserved and enhanced their social and economic position. ' The process of accommodating interests and building the Republican consensus unfolded at several levels between the late 1860s and the 1890s.2 From the beginning, the making of tariff policy was a crucial part of this process, especially for big businessmen and farmers. Yet it proved to be one of the hardest areas in which to reach an agreement.
against the trade treaties, beginning even before the fall of the Second Empire and peaking under the presidency of Adolphe Thiers, but in a series of parliamentary battles, first in the Corps legislatif and then in the National Assembly, this reaction was thwarted.3 For the time being France remained under the existing system. However, the permanent orientation of policy under the Third Republic was still to be determined. Already, during the reaction protectionniste of 1868-1873, the major economic interests of the country had divided into two rival camps on this issue. On one side were the so-called free traders (libre-echangistes), who demanded, at the very least, the preservation of the trade treaties that had eliminated or greatly reduced duties on almost all imports; on the other side were the protectionists who demanded the abrogation of all trade treaties and the enactment of high import duties. Once mobilized, these two groups fought almost continuously for the next twenty years to decide if France would return to high protection, maintain the moderate free trade policies of Napoleon III, or even move toward more complete free trade. In doing so, they posed a serious obstacle to the creation of the Republican consensus. Indeed, it can be argued that such a consensus was possible only when the conflict between the free traders and protectionists was resolved. In any case, it should be clear that no one can fully understand the process of accommodation, the formation of the Republican consensus, and thus the establishment of the Republican synthesis without first understanding the conflict on tariffs-who was involved, what they represented, and how they settled their differences. To provide such an understanding is the purpose of this article.
Who exactly were the protectionists and free traders? This can be ascertained, with proper recognition of the people who actually participated in the conflict and with proper emphasis on the interests having the greatest weight and the largest stake in the matter, through an examination of the parliamentary blocs which emerged in opposition to, or support of, the trade treaties between 1868 and 1873. For, with certain exceptions, the structure and composition of each "party" established at that time remained intact throughout the struggle.
The In examining the signers of the interpellations, one is first struck by the relative absence of agriculturalists or their representatives. Only four signers of the 1868 interpellation had direct connections to agriculture: baron de Janze, an important livestock breeder of the Cotes-du-Nord,Jules Brame and the baron des Rotours of the Nord, both of whom were involved in sugar beet cultivation, and FranCois Malezieux of the Aisne, a Saint-Quentin lawyer and agronomist who wrote for the Annales de l'agriculture franqaise.5 Somewhat more agriculturalist deputies signed the 1869 interpellation, but many of France's most characteristically agrarian departments nevertheless remained unrepresented in the interpellations. In the case of those that were represented, mainly of northern and western France, the signatory often turned out to be an industrialist, not an agriculturalist.6 All this indicates that in the late 1860s most of French 4 The signatories of the 1868 interpellation were listed in the Journal des economistes (May, 1868), pp. 315-16; signatories of the 1869 interpellation were listed in theJournal officiel de l'Empire franrais (December 15, 1869), p. 1628. The geographical distribution of both is depicted on p. 310. These lists may be supplemented by the membership lists of the later protectionist lobby, the Association de l'industrie francaise, founded in 1878. An analysis of those lists yields a picture of the protectionist party very similar to the one developed here on the basis of the interpellations. Smith, "Free Trade, Protection, and Tariff Reform," pp. 208-47. 5 Here and throughout, the information on the economic interests of deputies is derived chiefly, but not exclusively, from Adolphe Robert, Edgar Bourloton, and Gaston Cougny, eds., Dictionnaire des parlementaires fran(ais, 5 vols. (Paris, 1891). 6 For example, Leclerc d'Osmonville, deputy for the Mayenne and signer of both interpellations, was a coal mine operator. Ernest Carre-Kerisouit, who signed the 1869 interpellation as deputy for the Morbihan, was a maitre de forges. agriculture was indifferent to the siren song of protectionism. Indeed the peasant farmers of the interior were still largely immune to foreign competition because of the incompleteness of the railway system and thus had no fear of trade treaties, while the commercial farmers of the periphery-the winegrowers of the Bordelais and Languedoc and the wheat growers of the West and North-were shipping more and more produce to foreign markets and thus benefitted from the trade treaties. Not surprisingly, the Societe des agriculteurs, formed in 1868 to promote the interests of commercial agriculture, consistently supported the economic policies of the Second Empire, and its general secretary, Emile Lecouteux, repeatedly warned farmers against joining in any alliance with industrial protectionists.7 Most were following his advice at the end of the sixties and would continue to do so until the agragrian crisis of the early eighties.
At the outset of the Third Republic, the real strength of protectionism therefore lay in industry, which is not to say that all industrialists were protectionists. Further examination of the signers of the interpellations reveals that most were linked to mining, metallurgy, and textiles and, most specifically, to certain subdivisions of those industries located primarily in northern France, in an arc from Normandy to Alsace, and secondarily in central France.
Within mining and metallurgy, it was particularly the coal and coke iron industries of the North and the charcoal iron industry, politically important in the East, which supported tariff protection and supplied backers for the interpellations. The coal and iron producers of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais faced stiff competition from the British and the Belgians locally and in the Paris market and, quite naturally, the deputies drawn from their midst, including Thiers and Felix Lambrecht of Anzin, Rene Hamoir and August Stievenart of Valenciennes, and Alexandre Pinart of the Marquise ironworks (Pas-de-Calais), took the lead in attacking the treaties. Equally prominent in this attack were various representatives of thefer au bois industry, led by baron Lesperut of Saint-Dizier. They and other maitres de forges who smelted or refined iron with charcoal were plagued by fixed or rising production costs in an age of falling prices, and they unanimously favored a return to high protection as a means of keeping prices up.8 On the other hand, there was no unanimity on the issue of tariffs and trade treaties among the mining and metallurgical enterprises of central France. Some of the most technologically advanced companies of the region, including Le Creusot and Terrenoire, found that the trade treaties opened up new markets for them in Central Europe. Indeed, they were coming to depend on those markets for sale of their principal products-rails and railroad equipment-in the late sixties. Consequently their directors supported the treaties at that time, and would continue to do so until the late seventies. Other firms of the region, however, could not or would not enter these foreign markets and continued to depend on domestic markets. Since, from their point of view, the trade treaties only served to open those markets to foreign competition, their directors, as deputies, favored renunciation of the treaties. These included Louis-Jules Chagot of Blanzy, Christophe Mony of CommentryFourchambault, and Pierre Dorian of J. Holtzer et cie.9
The second major group involved in the interpellations and in the protectionist party consisted of certain textile manufacturers: flax and hemp spinners, the draps makers of Elbeuf and Sedan, and above all the cotton manufacturers of Normandy, the Nord and the East. emphasized that, while the protectionists drew their support mainly from industry, they hardly represented all industrialists, even within mining, metallurgy, and textiles.
If the preceding analysis shows that the protectionist party was narrower in its composition and more limited in its appeal at the outset of the Third Republic than is usually thought, a similar analysis of the free trade party shows that it was broader in its appeal and more diverse in its composition than is usually thought. The Parisian contingent in the caucus was actually made up of three different groups. One consisted of "radical" Republican politicians who, even as they rejected the Second Empire as a political system, continued to support its tariff policy to hold down consumer prices, especially on foodstuffs, for their working and middle class constituents. Their leader was Leon Gambetta, whose views on tariffs were spelled out from time to time throughout the seventies in the Republiquefranaaise.13 Also influential were Pierre Pascal-Duprat, who vigorously defended the trade treaties in 1872, and Pierre Tirard, who would eventually play a key role as commerce minister in the renegotiation of the trade treaties in 1881.14 However, others in this group, such as Louis Blanc and Henri Brisson, gave most of their attention to issues other than tariff and thus remained on the fringes of the caucus, their participation known only by their presence in the pro-trade treaty column in roll call votes. Consequently, the Radicals were not nearly as important for the activities of the caucus as was a second group of Parisian free traders, the professional economists.
As disciples of Adam Smith through J-B Say and Adolphe Blanqui, the French political economists found in the various grandes ecoles and faculties of Paris had naturally long supported free trade on principle. Moreover, they had long been acting on these principles. Since the 1840s they had campaigned tirelessly in the press and learned journals, through organizations like the Societe d'economie politique and through their positions in parliament and other government bodies, to bring about the liberalization of French economic policy.15 These efforts, of course, had culminated in the reforms of the 1860s, and in the early 1870s many veterans of this campaign were still active, trying to preserve and broaden these reforms. They included Joseph Garnier, editor of theJournal des economistes, Hippo- This analysis of the personnel and interests of the free trade party, when compared with the earlier analysis of the protectionists, reveals that at the root of the conflict over tariff policy in the early Third Republic was a split among divergent economic interests possessing correspondingly divergent views on France's future economic development and on its proper economic relationship with the rest of the world. The free trade party included some ideologues acting on the basis of liberal principles. However, free traders were more typically capitalists involved in international commerce-the grands negociants and financiers of Paris, Lyon, and the ports, railroad and shipping magnates, manufacturers and agriculturalists producing for export-who not only welcomed the reforms of the 1860s but also looked forward to and even depended on the continued integration of France into the emerging world market of the late nineteenth century. The protectionists, on the other hand, were those capitalists-especially certain textile and metallurgical manufacturers-who, for a variety of reasons, could not compete in the international market and therefore depended on local or regional markets and looked forward to the creation of a truly national market in France to serve as a privileged preserve for their production. In essence, then, the split between free traders and protectionists was a split between outwardly directed commercial capitalists seeking international economic integration and inwardly directed industrial capitalists seeking national self-sufficiency.
In addition to involving a conflict among capitalists with differing interests and orientations, the struggle over the tariff also involved to some extent a conflict between different regions of France. Unfortunately for the free traders, they were not able to preserve this victory in the midst of changing economic and political circumstances at home and abroad after 1882. For one thing, in response to economic depression more and more countries in Europe and worldwide were renouncing their commercial conventions in the 1880s in order to return to high protection, and this inevitably undercut the free trade system in France. After all, trade treaties-the backbone of free trade in the nineteenth century-could not be maintained unilaterally. Secondly, within France, the balance of interests, which had tended to favor the free traders in the 1870s, became increasingly favorable to the protectionists in the 1880s, when interests once committed to free trade, especially in agriculture, switched sides in the face of mounting foreign competition, and the place of the remaining free trade interests in the French economyfor reasons which cannot be dealt with here-declined relative to that of protectionist interests. It must be noted that the protectionists did get some benefits from the reforms of 1881-82. In addition to exempting agricultural duties from the trade conventions and thus allowing higher agricultural duties to be legislated as the need arose, the new system converted all ad valorem duties to fixed "specific" duties-that is to say, henceforth French duties were to remain constant, instead of fluctuating with prices. This meant that, in an era of falling prices, the import price (price at port of entry plus import duty) of goods coming into France would fall more gradually than world prices in general, which in turn meant that domestic producers would get more of a buffer against falling world prices and more protection against foreign competition under the new system than they would have gotten under the ad valorem system. This, of course, was not as beneficial as a direct increase in the level of import duties, but it was better than nothing.
38 This changing balance is revealed in what happened to tissus de soie, the foremost free trade manufacture, andfi/ s de coton, the foremost protectionist commodity. As indicated in T.J. Markovitch's table XVI (Cahiers de l'I.S.E.A., AF VI [June, 1966] ), the value of the average annual production of tissus de soie (exceeded that offifl s de coton in 1865-74,461 million francs to 451 million francs. In the succeeding period, however, the two were even: the average annual production of both declined to 291 million francs. Then, in 1885-94,fils de coton forged ahead-330 million francs versus 295 million francs-and it would remain ahead thereafter. So, whereas silk cloth had greater economic importance in the 1860s and 1870s (in terms of the value of its production), cotton spinning had become more important by the 1880s and 1890s. hands of avowed protectionists, such as Pierre Legrand, Auguste Dautresme, and Jules Meline, with growing frequency after 1882. Aided by all these developments, the protectionists thus succeeded in the second stage of the tariff battle in replacing both the general tariff of 1881 and the conventional tariff of 1882 with a sterner two-tiered schedule of duties embodied in the so-called Meline tariff of 1892.
Historians have invariably seen the Meline tariff as the final step in the inevitable return to protection in France after the fall of the Second Empire. While the Meline tariff did represent a definite swing away from the free trade policy of 1860-82 toward protection, it is important to note that the new tariff did not return France to the pre-1860 system of prohibitory duties but, in fact, represented, especially in the realm of industrial tariffs, something of a compromise between the interests of protectionists and free traders (although the exultation of the former and the lamentations of the latter in 1891-92 have obscured this point). The new law raised duties on most agricultural products, most finished consumer goods, and those semifinished goods, such as jute, linen, and cotton yarn and cloth, produced by industries reputed to be particularly hard pressed by foreign competitors. However, duties remained the same on many other producer and consumer goods, including coal and coke, most forms of iron and steel, and woolens (that is, the new minimum duty on these items equalled the old conventional duty). Moreover, even in cases where protection was increased, the law often provided loopholes to benefit big domestic importers. Thus the system of admissions temporaires, whereby duties were refunded on imported goods which served as raw materials for the manufacture of export goods, was maintained on all items to which it had previously applied, including wheat. This preserved the position of the Marseille milling industry, which had depended on the importation of east European grain since its founding in the 1860s. A similar arrangement, allowing 60 per cent of the duty on cotton yarn to be refunded if it were used to make cloth for export, saved the ribbon and tissus melanges manufacturers of the Rhone and Loire from the full effects of increased protection for French cotton spinners.39
This compromise was in part an unplanned and unforeseen product of the give-and-take of rival interests in the parliamentary arena in 1890-91. But it was also a product of the conscious desire of both business leaders operating from below and national political leaders operating from above to find the middle ground between absolute free trade and ironclad protection and to avoid the kind of one-sided (and thus politically dangerous) solution to the tariff question embodied in the reforms of 1881-82. This desire for compromise and accommodation was manifested as early as 1878, when theSleaders of the Saint-Etienne and Marseille chambers of commerce, because of the nature of the interests under their tutelage, demanded a measure of protection for some producers but, at the same time, recommended the maintenance of the existing trade treaties.40 More importantly, the Freycinet government and especially its minister of commerce, Jules Roche, exhibited this desire in guiding the tariff bill through parliament in 1891. As Roche later asserted, it was the government's intention "to conciliate, as much as possible, the diverse interests present" in the matter of the tariff. "France," he continued, "is at once an agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial country, and it is important for the development of its national genius as well as for its [national] strength to sacrifice none of the major elements of its life and prosperity."41
The success of this effort to strike a balance between free trade and protection and thereby to accommodate all parties to the issue is attested not only by the stipulations of the tariff law and by the self-congratulatory statements of its architects, but also by the survival and continued prosperity of all the major interests and, more clearly still, by the abatement of the long struggle between free traders and protectionists after 1892. To be sure, disagreements on tariff policy did not completely disappear. However, they no longer monopolized the attention of the interests as they had from 1860 to 1892. Having achieved a workable compromise, those formerly divided between the free trade and protectionist blocs increasingly cooperated in ventures of mutual benefit, such as colonial expansion. Moreover, they joined together in successfully defending the Republic, which now guaranteed the economic position of all of them, against the menace of those excluded from the Republican consensus, urban workers in particular. In this manner, the tariff, which had been an obstacle to the creation of the Republican synthesis for twenty years, became a key factor in preserving that synthesis well into the twentieth century.
